Avoiding triviality

In Toward a Theory of Instruction, Jerome Bruner insists that a theory of development must be linked both to a theory of knowledge and to a theory of instruction, “or be doomed to triviality.” (Bruner p. 21)

I’ve long felt that this is partly the reason so much of what passes for Christian education is at best benign, and that at worst, it has a tendency to trivialize faith. Being “interesting” may provide enough impetus to keep people coming back to participate in church religious education for a while, but ultimately, there are more “interesting” things in the world to capture and hold our attention if entertainment is our vehicle for retaining people’s participation in Christian education. An effective Christian education program (1) must give rigid attention to the developmental dynamics and processes of its subjects (learners), including motivation (which is based on “need” and not “interest”), (2) must hold to an epistemological philosophy of how learners learn (including an answer to the question, “how learners learn faith”), and, (3) must apply and practice a theory of learning related to how to teach, be it instruction, nurture, education, mentoring, etc.

Bruner suggests that mental growth “is in very considerable measure dependent on growth from the outside in—a mastering of [the ways] that are embodied in the culture and that are passed on in a contingent dialogue by agents of the culture.” (p. 21). He claims that this is the case when language and the symbolic systems of the culture are involved.

Can we say the same about faith development? Perhaps it’s helpful to consider that while faith is a (universal) human potential, it is dependent on growth from the outside in—a mastering of the ways the practices of faith are embodied in the faith community’s culture that are passed on, as Bruner says, “in a contingent dialogue by agents of the culture.” That strikes me as a more helpful and promising start at understanding how faith develops than fuzzy devotional notions, individualistic, or “magical thinking” related to how faith comes about and grows.

Further, Bruner’s statement that “much of the growth starts out by our turning around on our own traces and recoding in new forms, with the aid of adult tutors, what we have been doing or seeing, then going on to new modes of organization with the new products that have been formed by these recodings” (p. 21) suggests three things. First, the necessity of a core curriculum structured in a spiral or holographic framework. This allows for intentionality on creating opportunity for re-tracing and “recoding in new forms” the fundamental concepts of faith (this may be a good rationale for the power of the observance of liturgical cycles in worship and educational programming). Second, it highlights the necessity of mediating relationships for growth in understanding—teachers, mentors, spiritual friends. Third, the constructivist understanding of epistemology (knowing) through which the learner creates knowledge, insight, and meaning through the experiences of faith and relationships. Or, as Bruner puts it, “…the heart of the educational process consists of providing aids and dialogues for translating experience into more powerful systems of notation and ordering.” (p. 21).

“”What we think or what we believe is, in the end, of little consequence. The only thing of consequence is what we do.” John Ruskin